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Abstract 
Over the past decade, the EU and China have expanded their relations beyond a focus 
on economic and trade issues into the sphere of security. This is particularly evident 
when security is seen to encompass a variety of policy domains—from traditional, 
military security to non-traditional human security. However, this development has 
not followed an even or linear path: the record of EU-China security cooperation has 
been varied across different policy domains, with distinct temporal trajectories. This 
article addresses the question of why security cooperation between the two sides has 
advanced in certain policy domains while having faltered in others. Based on an 
expert survey of European and Chinese scholars, we explore both interest-driven and 
experience-driven explanations. Our analysis identifies a number of key events in the 
development of EU-China relations that have been critical in terms of initiating and 
enhancing cooperation in specific domains. Overall, we find that past experience with 
actual cooperation, rather than declared intentions, best explains the pattern of 
cooperation over time. 
 
  
Introduction 
What factors best explain the level of cooperation between the European Union (EU) 
and the People’s Republic of China in matters of security? Even with evident 
variation over time as well as across security domains, the large number of EU – 
China dialogues makes this a relevant question. In our analysis, the focus will be on 
China’s relations with the EU rather than with individual member states. After all, 
even noting the limited room of manoeuvre given competing interests and actions of 
its member states, the EU has emerged in recent years as a relevant security actor with 
a distinct foreign and security policy and a corresponding administration (the 
European External Action Service or EEAS) dedicated to promoting EU interests and 
values abroad. Moreover, the EU and China signed a ‘strategic partnership’ in 2003, 
and adopted a ‘2020 strategic agenda for cooperation’ in 2013. These agreements 
resulted from a mutual commitment to cooperation and signal an interest to further 
advance ties. 
 
It is important, in this context, to acknowledge the overwhelming weight of great 
power politics. Relations between the US and China, as major global powers, tends to 
limit attention on the often more mundane interactions between China and the EU. 
While this should not make the latter less pertinent, it does, however, suggest limits to 
the application of traditional approaches and concepts, such as balancing and power-
transition, to EU – China relations which is why in this paper we make use of a 
framework focused more on perceptions, experience and interaction.  
 
In contrast to the large amount of studies focusing on US – China relations, there is 
only limited scholarly interest in EU – China security relations. A first objective of 
this paper is therefore to provide an inventory of the kind of cooperation that has 
occurred across a range of traditional and non-traditional security dimensions. 
Following Most and Starr1, opportunities and constraints are seen as structuring 
security cooperation. Hence, a second objective is to identify key opportunities and to 
evaluate how, if at all, they explain patterns of cooperation. We expect that 
opportunities for cooperation vary, and that actual collaboration faces more or less 
serious challenges. Finally, we reflect on how individual EU member states as well as 																																																								
1 Benjamin A. Most & Harvey Starr, Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics (University of 
South Carolina 1989). 
global politics impose constraints on the development of EU – China security 
relations.  
 
Arguably the delegation of authority from the member states to the EU is still limited 
which may constrain EU – China cooperation, but over time the authority of the EU 
versus its member states has increased. The increased economic and military 
capabilities of the China are even more striking. Whereas the former should be 
generally promote EU – China security cooperation simply because the EU has 
become a more relevant partner, the effects of the so-called ‘rise of China’ is more 
mixed. On the one hand, China has taken on a more prominent role in global security 
as shown in non-proliferation, peacekeeping, and climate change. At the same time, it 
is also increasingly challenging the status quo, for example, in the South-China Sea 
and in other regional security issues.  
 
As is commonly recognized, the EU and China have long been major trading partners 
and have, in recent years, also become significant investors in each other’s 
economies. Apart from direct economic ties, the EU and China share an interest in an 
open, stable and good-functioning world economy. The spillover of shared economic 
interests into the security realm has commonly been cited as the main reason for 
security cooperation between the EU and China.2 From this perspective, economics 
not only determines the extent of security relations but also their particular nature. 
The EU – China Trade and Cooperation Agreement, concluded in 1985, still provides 
the fundamental legal agreement between both sides. Accordingly, security dialogues 
are said to focus on economic security and protecting economic interests, and 
economic interests have acquired particular prominence given the absence of pressing 
security concerns. Notably, the EU and China do neither perceive each as enemies or 
potential military threats, nor does the ‘rise of China’ have an immediate impact on 
EU interests. Even when EU officials worry about the impact of a more assertive 
China—for example in the South-China sea—on security in East and South-east Asia, 
this does not necessarily mean that the EU has a meaningful role to play.  
 
																																																								
2 See, Michael Smith & Huaixian Xie, The European Union and China: The Logics of 
“Strategic Partnership”, 6 J. Contemp. Eur. Res. 432 (2010). 
The willingness to cooperate results however not only from shared interests but also 
from a common understanding of the problems at hand as well as appropriate and 
feasible solutions. In this context, actual experiences with cooperation are particularly 
relevant in shaping the space for collaboration. Experience-based explanations 
emphasize learning and socialization as key elements for the diffusion of cooperation. 
By comparing security relations across domains as well as over time, we can evaluate 
the relative relevance of interests and experience. Empirically, we evaluate security 
cooperation between 1989 and 20153 across ten policy dimensions, namely: military 
security, proliferation and non-proliferation, regional security, cyber-security, 
terrorism and organized crime, human security, civil protection, migration, climate 
change and energy security, and economic security. The EU – China Strategic 
Partnerships has shaped cooperation across all these dimensions — and contrasts with 
events such as the Tiananmen Square massacre (1989) that burdened relations across 
the board. Other events had a much more specific impact; for example, the impact of 
EU assistance following the Wenchuan earthquake (2008) on civil protection. 
 
In the following section we survey existing theoretical approaches on EU – China 
security relations, contrasting interest- and experience-based explanations and 
exploring implications for cooperation across dimensions and over time. The third 
section outlines the framework of expert survey of European and Chinese scholars at 
the heart of this study. The fourth section presents the key results that are discussed 
further in the Conclusions. 
 
Perspectives on Security Cooperation 
The existing literature provides two useful starting points to think about what 
motivates and constrains security cooperation between the EU and China. First of all, 
there are extensive scholarly debates within the field of International Relations about 
why states cooperate.4 Here, interests, perceptions and institutions provide useful 
organizing principles.5 Alternatively, EU – China relations can be seen as a special 																																																								
3 The time period coincides with the EU developing a common foreign and security policy, 
and the agreement on China – EU strategic partnerships in 2003 and extended in 2010. 
4 Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton University Press 1986). 
5 Robert Axelrod & Robert O. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies 
and Institutions, in: Cooperation under Anarchy 226 – 254 (Kenneth A. Oye ed., Princeton 
University Press 1986). 
case of an emerging European foreign policy.6 The latter literature tends to be more 
policy-oriented and to follow either a Constructivist or (Historical) Institutionalist 
approach. 
 
Table 1 provides a brief summary of the key theoretical positions and conceptual 
contributions with regards to opportunities and constraints. Further, it applies these 
concepts to EU – China relation to highlight key variation across issue dimensions 
and time. Exogenously determined interests underlie both Realist and Liberal 
approaches where a narrow respectively broad definition of security interests is the 
key distinguishing factor. Constructivist approaches draw attention to the role of 
perception and social interaction in the formation of preferences. Institutionalism 
approaches highlight path-dependency as well as critical events or junctures. 
 
The Realist understanding of the international system emphasizes sovereignty and 
‘self-help’, thereby limiting the room for bilateral cooperation in security matters. 
Cooperation is conditional on the presence of an immediate security threat – e.g., 
when facing a common enemy – or shared security interests in dealing with third 
parties – e.g., when providing personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. 
Accordingly, balancing and ‘bandwagoning’ provide opportunities for cooperation. A 
key constraint is the risk of entanglement underscoring the potential costs of 
collaboration. Hence, cooperation is generally regarded as being highly conditional, 
and issue- and time-contingent. Security is seen as ‘high’ politics, most obviously in 
case of cooperation on military and regional security, proliferation and non-
proliferation, and international terrorism. Yet also in other areas threats towards the 
state may emerge, for example, around issues such as cyber- and human security, and 
if so security cooperation will remain weak. In ‘low’ politics domains such as 
economics, civil protection and climate policies, joint action is more feasible, but 
Realists question whether these policy domains concern state security.  
 
Liberals see possible mutual gains and opportunities for cooperation across the full 
security domain. Given increasing trade and investment flows, the Chinese and 																																																								
6 Sebastian Bersick, The EU’s Bilateral Relations with China, in: The Sage Handbook of 
European Foreign Policy vol 2, 615 – 633 (Knud E. Jørgensen, Åsne K. Aarstad, Edith 
Drieskens, Katie Lattikainen & Ben Tonra eds, Sage 2015). 
European economies have become increasingly interconnected, putting economic 
security central to the EU – China relations. Closer economic ties also affect other 
security domains such as immigration but also increased risks of the spread of 
diseases such as the H5N1 (bird flu) virus linking economic security to civil 
protection. Because of their direct responsibility for the single European market, EU 
institutions have acquired broad responsibilities to act on such issues.7 Shared interest 
in a stable global order creates further opportunities for collaboration on regional 
security (e.g., via the ASEAN Regional Forum, ARF) and non-proliferation. External 
events, such as the global financial crisis after 2009, the prospect of Brexit, and the 
changing US foreign policy of the Trump Presidency, all have a major impact on EU 
– China relations. 
 
Table 1 Approaches to EU – China Security Cooperation 
Approach Security Cooperation Variation 
 Opportunity Constraint Issue Temporal  
Realist Balancing Entanglement High versus 
Low Politics 
‘Rise of China’ 
Liberal Common 
interests 
Divergence 
of democratic 
norms 
Issue specific 
from trade 
interest to 
human rights  
Global 
financial crisis 
and risks to 
global trade 
Constructivist Shared 
perceptions 
and 
understandings  
Misunderstan
dings and 
conceptual 
gaps 
Issue specific 
from global 
order to post-
modern values 
EU 
institutionalizat
ion and crises. 
Institutionalist Density of 
institutional 
framework and 
structuring 
agreements 
Lack of 
history in 
EU-China 
security 
relations 
Policy and 
institutional 
diffusion 
Path 
dependency 
and critical 
junctures 
  
Depending on the specific security issue under consideration, EU and Chinese 
interests may thus be more aligned, making it easier to achieve collaboration, or more 																																																								
7 Details are provided in Han Dorussen, Evangelos Fanoulis & Emil J. Kirchner, The EU as a 
Regulator of Civil Security across Europe, in: EU Civil Security Governance: Diversity and 
Cooperation in Crisis and Disaster Management 211 – 232 (Henrik Hegemann & Raphael 
Bossong eds, Palgrave 2015), and Emil J. Kirchner, Evangelos Fanoulis & Han Dorussen, 
Civil Security in the EU: National Persistence versus EU Ambitions? 24 Eur. Secur. 
 287 (2015). 
opposed, making it harder to do so. The EU and China, moreover, often do not share a 
common normative understanding of the global international order; for example, with 
respect to democracy, the rule of law and human rights. This lack of normative 
agreement may constitute an important constraint on the further development of EU – 
China security relations, but do not necessarily and always impede it. Neo-liberal 
institutionalism points at the relevance of institutions to provide linkages across issue 
domains. Institutions can also be designed to monitor and, if necessary, sanction 
agreements.8 Accordingly, the increased involvement of the EU and China in bi- and 
multilateral agreements is seen as pertinent. 
 
Also from a Constructivist perspective, opportunities for cooperation present 
themselves across the full domain of security issues. Rather than exogenously 
determined alignment of interests, for Constructivists the ability of actors to forge 
such an alignment matters.9 Differences between the perceptions and conceptual 
understanding of key elements for security collaboration (such as sovereignty, human 
rights) and international norms (such as a Responsibility to Protect) are seen as 
important constraints,10 while the ability to overcome such differences presents 
valuable opportunities.   
 
For the EU, its normative understanding is seen as particularly important for its 
ambitions to build security relationships with other states, including with China. 
Smith and Xie argue that three core logics explain the EU interest in strategic 
partnerships. First, the integration logic suggests that the need for an external policy 
is a “spillover or the projection of internal needs”.11 The (dis)similarity of interests 
and preferences of the EU member states affect opportunities for advancing an 
common interest. Secondly, an external logic emphasizes the pressures and 																																																								
8 Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The rational design of international 
institutions, 55 Int. Organ. 761 787 – 791 (2001), and Han Dorussen & Emil J. Kirchner, 
Better a Good Neighbor than a Distant Friend: The Scope and Impact of Regional Security 
Organizations, 14 Int. Relat. Asia-Pac.117, 121 – 122 (2014). 
9 D. Kerr & Liu Fei, The International Politics of EU-China Relations (Oxford University 
Press 2007). 
10 Zhongqi Pan, Managing the conceptual gap on sovereignty in China-EU relations 8 Asia 
Eur. J. 227 (2010), and Jorn-Carsten Gottwald & Niall Duggan, Diversity, pragmatism and 
convergence: China, the European Union and the issue of sovereignty, in: Conceptual Gaps 
in China-EU Relations. Global Governance, Human Rights and Strategic Partnerships 35 – 
49 (Zhongqi Pan ed., Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 
11 Smith & Xie, supra n. 2, at 435. 
opportunities arising from broader international structures. Thirdly, the identity logic 
explains the search of strategic partnerships as “bound up with the search of a 
European identity, and thus with the generation of images and understandings of the 
EU itself, both within and outside the Union”.12 They conclude: 
 
(…) the search for an EU China ‘strategic partnership’ reflects the 
perception in key EU institutions that the Union has a role in introducing 
China to the global order and ensuring that the Chinese play by the rules of 
global society (as interpreted by the EU). We should of course also note that 
this perception has often been met by an equally firm Chinese perception 
that they will do things their own way, and by their capacity to resists or 
reject the EU’s presumption.13 
 
Accordingly, differences in perceptions and the ability of key Chinese and EU actors 
to overcome such differences, or convergence, should largely explain variation in 
opportunities for cooperation. Development (and crises) of EU institutions is seen as 
most pertinent for any temporal variation in efforts to achieve EU – China 
collaboration.  
 
Since 2003, EU – China relations have become increasingly institutionalized14. There 
are regular EU – China Summits and efforts to negotiate a Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement. From 2013 as part of the EU – China 2020 Strategic Agenda 
for Cooperation, negotiations have been held on a EU – China bilateral investment 
agreement. The prospects for a China – EU bilateral investment agreement are being 
explored since 2012. Institutionalism emphasizes the opportunities the increased 
density of such agreements offer for future collaboration.15 Whereas initially 
dialogues and agreements focus on the most salient issues (in the case of EU – China 
primarily economic ties), cooperation is expected to diffuse to strategic and security 
domains – for example the High-Level Strategic Dialogues within the 2020 Strategic 																																																								
12 Smith & Xie, supra n. 2, at 435. 
13 Smith & Xie, supra n. 2, at 444. 
14	Thomas Christiansen, A Liberal Institutionalist Perspective on China-EU Relations, in: 
China, the European Union and International Politics of Global Governance 29 – 50 (J. 
Wang & W. Song eds, Palgrave 2016).	
15 David Shambaugh, China and Europe: the emerging axis, 103 Current History 243 (2004). 
Agenda. Studying EU – China engagement with peacekeeping, Cottey and Duggan 
(2016) argue that increased experience with collaboration on the ground has promoted 
security collaboration more generally.16 
 
In spite of the impressive network of EU – China interactions, from this perspective 
there are clear limits to the development of security cooperation.17 First of all, there is 
a relative ‘lack of history’ in EU – China diplomatic relations; they exist only for 
about forty years and a strategic partnership only since 2003. The European External 
Action Service is also a very ‘young player’ internationally. Finally, there is a legacy 
of more problematic engagements: the 1989 events surrounding Tiananmen Square 
and the continuing European arms embargo against the PRC, and the denial of market 
economy status for the PRC.  
 
In summary, analyses of EU – China security cooperation can be distinguished 
between interest-driven (broadly Realist and Liberal) and experience-driven (broadly 
Constructivist and Institutionalist). A further distinction is between a narrowly 
conceived security agenda (in line with Realist and, less clearly, Institutionalist 
approaches) and a broad security agenda (Liberal and Constructivist). Table 2 outlines 
the expectations of these perspectives on the pattern and development of EU – China 
security relations. The classification identifies specific expectations for EU – China 
security cooperation across policy domains as well as its development of time, and 
will guide the empirical analysis in the following sections. 
  
																																																								
16 Andrew Cottey & Duggan, China-EU Relations in Global Security Governance. A Study of 
Sino-EU Cooperation and Conflict in United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping, Paper presented at 
the UACES 46th Annual Conference, London, 5-7 September 2016. 
17 Jonathan Holslag, The elusive axis: assessing the EU – China strategic partnership, 49 J. 
Common Mark. Stud. 293 (2011).	
 Table 2 Classification of Expectations for EU – China Security Cooperation 
  Security Domain 
  Specific Encompassing 
Te
m
po
ra
l In
te
re
st
-d
riv
en
  
(Realist): limited opportunities 
for cooperation with 
cumulative structural 
constraints limiting joint action 
 
(Liberal): general opportunities 
for cooperation with issue specific 
variation in structural constraints 
supporting joint action 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e-
dr
iv
e  
(Institutionalist): limited 
opportunities for cooperation, 
but increasing joint actions 
within specific domains 
 
(Constructivist): general and 
opportunities for cooperation with 
joint action diffusing across 
domains 
 
Research Design 
We rely in our analysis and evaluation of EU – China security relations on a survey of 
European and Chinese scholars. These experts in specific security domains 
collaborated in their assessment.18 As part of the EU funded research project EU – 
China Security Cooperation, we convened four workshops in 2014 and 2015 bringing 
them together to discuss a common framework for analysis and to enhance 
cooperation between the European and Chinese scholars. 
 
The analysis covers a range of traditional and non-traditional security dimensions. 
The ten selected areas are: military security, regional security, nuclear proliferation, 
terrorism and organized crime, climate and energy security, human security, civil 																																																								
18 In total 25 experts were identified for their knowledge regarding specific issue domains. 
The experts represent a variety of theoretical and epistemological approaches. All experts are 
scholars working at universities and policy institutes in Australia, Belgium, China, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Singapore, and the UK. For any particular issue domain, the 
European and Chinese scholars collaborated in the formulation and assessment of their 
assessments. The demarcation of the various policy domains was agreed upon at the 
workshops. In-depth analysis of each security domain can be found in the contributions to 
Emil J. Kirchner, Thomas Christiansen & Han Dorussen eds, Security Relations between 
China and the European Union. From Convergence to Cooperation? (Cambridge University 
Press 2016) 
protection, cyber security, economic security, and migration and immigration. These 
dimensions are explicitly referred to in both Chinese official policy papers as well as 
key EU documents such as the 2003 European Security Strategy and its 2008 
Implementation Report.  
 
In contrast with most existing studies, the focus of the analysis is on EU – China 
relations rather than ‘Sino-European’ security relations. Similarly, the focus is on 
direct EU – China relations instead of placing these relations in light of a third party – 
most commonly the US or Russia, but also Africa as an ‘external’ region has received 
scholarly attention.19 The choice was mainly made to be able to assess the role (or 
lack thereof) as the EU as a security actor, and the relevance of EU – China relations 
in their own right rather than derivative from a US (or Russia) centred perspective. At 
the same time, we obviously recognize the independent role of key European states, in 
particular, the UK, Germany and France, and as well as the internal EU decision-
making procedures. We are also aware of the relevance of global, great power, 
politics as structuring EU – China relations. Experts were explicitly invited to 
comment on these aspects while keeping their focus on EU – China security relations. 
 
For each of the dimensions, the experts were asked to identify threat perceptions as 
well as responses. In the first instance, assessments were made for the EU and China 
separately. Subsequently, an assessment was made of the degree of convergence or 
divergence regarding threat perceptions and responses between the EU and China. 
Any such convergence might apply both to the conceptual and normative 
understanding of the threat and policy response, but also to the actual content of 
policy responses. Experts based their assessment on key official statements of the 
Chinese government and EU institutions; in other words, the analysis is based on 
agreed policy rather than on the opinions of individual officials. Finally, the experts 																																																								
19 For example, see Gill Bates, The United States and the China-Europe relationship, in: 
China – Europe Relations: Perceptions, Policies and Prospects 270 – 286 (David 
Shambaugh, Eberhard Sandschneider & Zhou Hong eds, Routledge 2008), Shulong Chu & 
Songchuan Chen, US-China-Europe security relations: global security structure and order in 
the twenty-first century, in: China, Europe and International Security: Interests, Roles and 
Prospects 91 – 106 (Frans-Paul van der Putten & Shulong Chu eds, Routledge 2011), Linda 
Jacobson & Jacob Wood, China’s expanding role in Africa and implications for the EU, in: 
Europe and China: Strategic Partners or Rivals? 139 – 154 (Roland Vogt ed., Hong Kong 
University Press 2012). 
made an inventory of EU – China joint actions as evidence for cooperation at the 
bilateral as well as multilateral level.  
 
The study relies on specific criteria to measure convergence and cooperation as the 
key concepts in the analysis. Convergence is assessed by (i) the extent to which 
uniform positions exist within the EU and China on the perception of threat and 
relevant response, and (ii) the extent of (dis)agreement on underlying principles such 
as sovereignty and (non)intervention. Rather than emphasizing constant opportunities 
and constraints, which would lead to a largely static assessment, scholars were asked 
to explore developments over time. This more dynamic approach aims to investigate 
whether any argument for convergence has either weakened or strengthened, and 
whether opportunities for cooperation have expanded, restricted or simply shifted. 
Cooperation is assessed on the basis of three principles: (i) progress from intentions, 
to agreements, to joint actions, (ii) barriers to cooperation both internal, such as 
sovereignty, as well as external, e.g., the role of third parties such as the US, and (iii) 
whether collaboration is in line with converging perception of threat and response. To 
summarize the rich information found in the various case studies, we proposed a 
simple categorization of convergence in threat perception and policy response into 
high, medium and low.  
 
With regards to the way in which threats in a given issue domain are perceived on 
either side, the categorization is defined as follows: 
- High: developments are regarded as a main or significant threat and associated 
with a high propensity to affect the peace and stability of the polity. 
- Medium: developments are seen as a threat but not involving a high propensity 
to affect the peace and stability of the polity. 
- Low: developments have received little, if any, attention as a threat. 
 
However even in areas where the EU and China share similar perceptions of threats, 
they do not necessarily respond with the same policies. It is also possible that the EU 
and China do not give a similar priority or salience to implementing any policy 
responses. In order to measure convergence, we follow the following definitions for 
the categorization of levels of convergence between China and the EU: 
- High: similar degrees of threat perception – as defined above – and high 
degree of overlap in relevant domestic response. 
- Medium: either variation in the degree to which they perceive the level of 
threat in a particular issue domain or in how their domestic policies respond to 
these threats. 
- Low: variation in the way they perceive the threat and in the extent or degree 
to which domestic actions have been introduced.  
 
The objective is moreover to provide an aggregate view on the level of cooperation. 
With a focus on joint actions at either the bilateral or multilateral level, we 
operationalize degrees of cooperation as follows: 
 
- High: both partners actively and frequently encourage joint actions, including 
the involvement of personnel or resources; no or little evidence of any clear 
barriers to joint actions. 
- Medium: infrequent joint actions but a common understanding and recognition 
that problems can be solved jointly, including evidence of willingness to 
commit personnel and resources; some evidence that barriers impede the 
regularity of joint actions. 
- Low: joint action is absent or occasional; cooperation takes place 
predominantly at the level of discourse or intention rather than practice; 
constraining factors present clear barriers. 
 
Finally, an effort was made to identify key events that shaped the development of EU 
– China security relations in each of the ten dimensions. 
 
Findings 
THREAT PERCEPTION of the EU and China is summarized in Table 3. The table gives 
the expert assessment for the ten security dimensions focused on the period 2010 – 
2015. It shows that there is considerable consistency in the way the EU and China 
officially rate threats across the different domains.  
 
Both sides consider the threat level of terrorism / organized crime, proliferation and 
regional threats as high. This does not necessarily imply that they agree on the 
specific content of the threat. Obviously, the different neighbourhoods of the EU and 
China lead to distinct threat perceptions in regional security. China is mainly occupied 
with East and South China Sea and the Korean peninsula, whereas Europe main 
concerns focus on its eastern (Ukraine, the Baltics and Russia) and southern borders 
(North Africa and the Middle East, in particular Syria). Yet there is some geographic 
overlap: both China and the EU are increasingly concerned about the instability 
emanating from the Central Asia region.20 Even given agreement about the 
geographical focus of a threat, however, there does not have to be a similarity in the 
source of terrorist threats; the EU is mostly and increasingly concerned with Islamist 
radicals, while China main concern is with domestic terrorism. Bossong and Holmes 
observe that “Chinese attempts to associate domestic terrorists, mainly Uighurs, with 
global Islamist terrorism have not generally been recognized by Western countries.”21 
With regards to (non)proliferation, the EU and China share a concern with the 
programs of North Korea and Iran. 
 
Table 3 Comparison of Levels of Threat Perception in the EU and China 
Security Dimension EU threat perception China threat perception 
Regional Security High High 
Nonproliferation High High 
Terrorism and organized crime High High 
Climate change & energy security High High (energy) / Medium 
(climate)  
Military security High Medium 
Migration and immigration High Low 
Civil protection Medium Medium 
Cyber security Medium Medium 
Economic security  Medium Medium 
Human security Medium Low 
Source: Kirchner et al., supra n. 18, at 231. 
 
																																																								
20 Thomas Diez, Eva Scherwitz & See Seng Tan, Regional Solutions for Regional Conflicts?, 
in: Security Relations between China and the European Union 42 (Emil J. Kirchner, Thomas 
Christiansen & Han Dorussen eds, Cambridge University Press 2016) 
21 Raphael Bossong & Leslie Holmes, Terrorism and Organized Crime: Common Concerns 
but Different Interests, in: Security Relations between China and the European Union 81 
(Emil J. Kirchner, Thomas Christiansen & Han Dorussen eds, Cambridge University Press 
2016). 
Cyber security, civil protection and economic security are perceived to yield medium 
level threats by both sides. Here there is also considerable overlap in the perceived 
sources of the threat, namely the consequences of technological developments for 
economic and political stability. For the remaining dimensions – military security, 
human security, energy security and climate change – we observe more discrepancies 
in the official risk assessments. The EU is increasingly concerned that military 
posturing by Putin’s Russia reveals the limited European defence capabilities, while 
China is becoming more confident in its military strength. The various refugee crises 
have pushed immigration high on the EU agenda, while domestic migration and 
actual outward flow of Chinese migrants are only of limited concern for China. The 
EU perceives crises in governance and failed human security as a source of multiple 
threats (regional security, migration and terrorism). Chinese officials remain reluctant 
to subscribe to ‘Western’ notions of human security, while recognizing the 
consequences of state failure.  
 
CONVERGENCE of domestic policy response between the EU and China is often 
limited. In some areas there is convergence in policy approach, for example, both the 
EU and China have financed large-scale investment programs to stimulate growth and 
address any economic insecurities. In civil protection, China increasingly adopts a 
civilian-led and more devolved approach comparable with standard practices in the 
EU-area. At the same time, Chinese crisis management remains clearly more 
hierarchical with lack of ownership at the local level. For most areas, however, 
experts observe clear differences between Chinese and EU responses to security 
threats; most strikingly regarding cyber security.  
 
The EU has a fundamentally different approach to cyber security to that of 
China, and also the United States and Russia, who follow a national security 
(threat) logic that favors deterrence and militarization, and thus hard cyber 
power. The EU focuses on soft cyber power – that is, building resilience to 
ensure rapid recovery from cyber attacks, building the necessary capacity to 
resist cyber attacks, and fighting cyber crime.22 																																																								
22 Sebastian Bersick, George Christou & Shen Yi, Cybersecurity and EU – China Relations, 
in: Security Relations between China and the European Union 172 (Emil J. Kirchner, Thomas 
Christiansen & Han Dorussen eds, Cambridge University Press 2016). 
 Low levels of convergence are also observed with respect to terrorism and energy 
security even though both the EU and China perceive threats as high. As possible 
reasons for the discrepancy, value considerations such as sovereignty and non-
intervention, and identity formation were mentioned. Table 4 summarizes the levels 
of convergence on threat perception and policy response as well as the overall record 
of cooperation. 
 
COOPERATION between the EU and China can be found across security domains. 
“Particularly noticeable is actual cooperation in key areas of traditional security, such 
as the joint antipiracy naval exercise off the coast of Somalia (the EU-led operation 
Atlanta) and the nuclear negotiations with Iran, which were chaired by the EU’s High 
Representative.”23 Cooperation, however, is never sufficient frequent nor barrier-free 
to warrant a ‘high’ classification; for example, in the area of nuclear non-proliferation 
there is a marked contrast between cooperation on the Iran file and the North Korean 
situation where China allows the EU to play only a limited role.  
 
In civil protection, the EU and China have increased bilateral cooperation following 
the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake. This benchmark event prompted the EU-China 
Disaster Risk Management Project in 2012. The EU and China also both engage in 
the proceedings of the UN Office of Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR). In the 
aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the EU publicly expressed appreciation of 
the China’s humanitarian support in Haiti. There is also cooperation through the 
activities of the ARF (linking to the regional security domain) and as part of increased 
Chinese involvement in peacekeeping (with obvious relevance for human security). In 
March 2015, the Chinese navy evacuated, among others, European citizens from 
Yemen, providing an interesting connection to military security.  
 
Regarding economic cooperation, “[t]opics arising in the bilateral trade and 
investment relationship are discussed in a number of specific dialogs, of which the 
EU-China High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue (HED) is especially important 
																																																								
23 Kirchner et al., supra n. 18, at 234. 
in terms of economic security”.24 The G20 is also seen as the main forum to cooperate 
in responding to global economic challenges. China and the EU signed new 
agreement on customs cooperation in July 2014. Yet, these instances of active 
cooperation are somewhat marred by continued disagreement about China’s market-
economy status within the WTO.   
 
In a number of security domains, cooperation is nearly exclusively at the level of 
discourse and joint statements with only occasional examples of practical cooperation. 
For example, EU – China cooperation on migration has seen some recent joint actions 
in the context of the dialogue on EU – China Mobility and Migration in 2013, and 
EU-sponsored seminars in China led by the International Organization of Migration. 
FRONTEX has also been part of training and sharing best practice with China in 
combating human trafficking. Neither terrorism nor organized crime has been high on 
the agenda of the annual EU – China Summits. In comparison with the other strategic 
partners of the EU, Renard25 considers the level of cooperation on terrorism with 
China as the most limited. Nevertheless, Bossong and Holmes note that “at technical 
levels, operational security cooperation is advancing”,26 for example, in joint customs 
operations which suggests a ‘medium’ level of joint action at least in the area of 
organized crime. In the area of cyber security, Bersick et al. conclude that “(d)ifferent 
logics and cyber cultures have so far inhibited meaningful bilateral and multilateral 
dialog and cooperation”.27 At the same time, they observe that the European 
Commission has been more pragmatic in its approach to Chinese cyber espionage 
activity when compared to the United States.28 
  
  
																																																								
24 Gustaaf Geeraerts & Weiping Huang, The Economic Security Dimension of the EU-China 
Relationship: Puzzles and Prospects, in: Security Relations between China and the European 
Union 202 (Emil J. Kirchner, Thomas Christiansen & Han Dorussen eds, Cambridge 
University Press 2016). 
25 Thomas Renard, Confidential Partnership? The EU, Its Strategic Partners and 
International Terrorism, ESPO Working Paper, 4 (Jan. 2014). 
26 Bossong & Holmes, supra n. 21, at 90. 
27 Bersick et al., supra n. 22, at 180. 
28 Bersick et al., supra n. 22, at 181. 
 Table 4 Comparison of Levels of Convergence and EU – China Cooperation  
Security Dimension Convergence of 
threat perception 
and policy response 
Cooperation, joint 
actions at bilateral / 
multilateral level 
Non-proliferation Medium Medium 
Civil protection Medium Medium 
Economic security  Medium Medium 
Regional Security Medium Medium/Low 
Climate change & energy security Low/Medium Medium  
Military security Low Low/Medium 
Human security Low Low/Medium 
Terrorism and organized crime Low Low/Medium 
Cyber security Low Low 
Migration and immigration Low Low 
Source: Adapted from Kirchner et al., supra n. 18, at 236.  
 
For the security dimensions discussed so far, the degree of convergence of threat 
perception and policy response roughly matches the level of cooperation. This 
suggests that actual or perceived interests are indeed relevant for joint action. We 
observe discrepancies between convergence and cooperation on the remaining 
dimensions. On regional security, cooperation falls short of what may have been 
expected based on convergence. Regarding climate change, energy, military and 
human security, there are infrequent joint actions in spite of clear divergence of threat 
perception and policy response. 
 
The EU’s 2015 Strategic Review and the 2017 Strategy for Central Asia emphasize 
cooperation and the desire to explore linkages with the Chinese-led Silk Road 
initiative. Other instances of active engagement on regional security take place in the 
context of the ARF and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Nevertheless, the EU and 
China present distinct and sometimes even competing models of regionalization. The 
very limited role of the EU in addressing increased Chinese maritime assertiveness in 
the East and South China accentuates that EU-Chinese cooperation in regional 
security is infrequent at best.  
 
Some of the joint actions classified under civil protection or regional security could 
also serve as examples of joint actions under human security. However, the Chinese 
government may not regard these actions as instances of human security since it 
retains a contrasting perspective on the content and norms of the latter (for example, 
regarding individual versus collective rights and sovereignty versus a Responsibility 
to Protect). 
 
Counter-piracy has been the main area for military-to-military relations and joint 
actions. Duke and Wong29 highlight the antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and 
the quarterly Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings in Bahrain of 
the parties involved in counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, the Horn of 
Africa and the Western Indian Ocean. There are also various on-going dialogues 
covering military security. At the same time, the ambitions of the EU to enhance 
transparency and cooperation, intensify military-to-military contacts and engage in 
high level security dialogue are not fully realized.30 Beijing however argues that the 
on-going arms embargo (implemented following the repression of the Tiananmen 
Square protests in 1989) is a hindrance to greater EU – China defence cooperation. 
Apart from its direct (but rather limited) effects, China views the arms embargo as 
relevant because “it has raised questions about the EU’s ability to maintain an 
independent position from the US and its ability to reach consensus among its 
members”.31 Bo, Biedenkopf and Chen argue that “(t)he EU and Chine have 
responded to climate security in different ways but with a converging trend”.32 This 
has resulted in joint actions at the bilateral level and increasingly the global level. 
Concrete joint actions have taken place in the field of “renewable energy, clean coal, 
biofuel and energy efficiency”.33  
 
Conclusions 																																																								
29 Simon Duke & Reuben Wong, Chinese and EU Views of Military Security: Crafting 
Cooperation, in: Security Relations between China and the European Union 33 (Emil J. 
Kirchner, Thomas Christiansen & Han Dorussen eds, Cambridge University Press 2016). 
30 Duke & Wong, supra n. 29, at 28. 
31 Duke & Wong, supra n. 29, at 33. 
32 Yan Bo, Katja Biedenkopf & Zhimin Chen, Chinese and EU Climate and Energy Security 
Policy, in: Security Relations between China and the European Union 114 (Emil J. Kirchner, 
Thomas Christiansen & Han Dorussen eds, Cambridge University Press 2016). 
33 Bo et al., supra n. 32, at 115. 
Table 2 outlined four possible patterns for security cooperation emphasizing variation 
in joint actions over time and across issue domains. Considering the findings of our 
survey, we can note, first of all, that there are instances of joint action in nearly all 
security domains. At the same time, only in a small number of security domains is 
there any regularity with regard to joint action being undertaken. There is little 
evidence to suggest that cooperation is restricted to ‘low’ or non-traditional security; 
for example, the EU and Chinese joint action on the Iran file is a clear instance of 
cooperation on a ‘high’ security issue. The EU and China have also acted jointly on 
humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and joint customs operations. Possibly even 
more telling is that such joint actions, even in non-traditional security domains, 
commonly involve military-to-military relations. EU and Chinese maritime vessels 
have cooperated in fighting piracy and (military) peacekeeping forces have worked 
together in peacekeeping missions in South Sudan and Mali.  
 
Over the last decade, the EU and China have established an extensive network of 
dialogues. Since 2010 their strategic partnership includes foreign affairs, security 
matters and global challenges. Annual EU – China summits include discussions on 
security cooperation, and the 2012 summit encouraged regular dialogue on defence 
and security policy. In a number of security domains, such as cyber security, 
migration and human security, fundamental normative differences persist and 
generally impede joint action. At the same time, increased Chinese ambitions and 
capacity to act as a global power have not constrained EU – Chinese cooperation. The 
EU shares American concerns about Chinese territorial claims in the East and South 
China seas, and may even be more aware of rapidly expanding Chinese economic 
interest in Africa, but these concerns have so far not thwarted joint action.  
 
Despite its long history of integration, the EU remains composed of states with 
distinct foreign and defence policies. The 2009 Lisbon treaty led to the appointment 
of a High Representative for foreign and security policy and the creation of the 
European External Action Service, thus creating a bureaucracy to match the ambitions 
of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Nevertheless a common policy does not imply a single 
policy, and individual member states have maintained their own links with China. In 
practice, the ability (or even willingness) of China to pursue a ‘divide and rule’ 
approach appears rather limited, but there are increasing concerns about the initiatives 
such as the 16+1 format for cooperation between China and the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe or the implementation of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. So 
far, however, individual member states tend to promote an agreed EU stance in fora 
such as the UN Security Council where the EU’s own institutional position is weak. 
Alternatively, initiatives from individual member states eventually become EU 
actions.34 The potential impact of the UK decision to leave the EU on the actual or 
perceived relevance of the EU in security matters falls outside the time period covered 
by our study.  
 
Inevitably, the US is the ‘elephant in the room’ in any bilateral China – EU relations 
given the strong security links between Europe and the US, most importantly via 
NATO as well as the American military presence in the Asia-Pacific. The Atlantic 
and Pacific are also rather loosely connected security regions (at least from a 
European perspective). This makes it feasible for the EU to engage with China across 
a range of different initiative even when the US raises concerns. An example is that 
most European states have become members of the Asia Infrastructure Investment 
Bank against the explicit preference of Washington. On the other hand, the EU has 
not seen it opportune to lift the arms embargo against China. As with Brexit, the 
election of the Trump presidency and its possible impact on EU – China relations falls 
outside the scope of our study. If anything it makes China and the EU looks as more 
predictable negotiating partners. 
 
Based on the findings presented here, two main conclusions can be drawn to explain 
the pattern of EU – Chinese cooperation. First, the alignment of interests in specific 
areas, for example the Iran nuclear deal, regional security in Central Asia, or customs 
cooperation to fight fraud and counterfeiting by organized crime is best explained in 
line with the expectations of Liberalism: opportunities for cooperation exist across a 
number of security domains, but issue-specific variation in constraints ultimately 
determines whether particular joint action occurs. 
																																																								
34 Han Dorussen, Ling Jin & Evangelos Fanoulis, Civil Protection: Identifying Opportunities 
for Collaboration, in: Security Relations between China and the European Union 156-157 
(Emil J. Kirchner, Thomas Christiansen & Han Dorussen eds, Cambridge University Press 
2016). 
Second, practical experiences with joint action have encouraged further collaboration 
in a number of security domains: joint naval and peacekeeping operations have 
facilitated and diffused joint actions in military security, civil protection and, 
arguably, human security – in the case of the latter even without the presence of a 
shared understanding. Examples here are the evacuations of civilians from Libya and 
Yemen. Arguably, practical cooperation on renewable energy and energy efficiency 
between the EU and China has also contributed to the emergence of joint action on 
climate change and ultimately helped to create Chinese support for the 2016 Paris 
Agreement. This provides evidence that, in line with Institutionalist expectations, , 
joint actions within specific domains may occur even when opportunities for 
cooperation appeared to be limited. 
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